Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Essential Readings

Finus, Michael; Caparros, Alejandro

Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

01/2015

992

Dura

Inglês

9781782545095

15 a 20 dias

This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.
Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparros PART I FOUNDATIONS 1. Karl-Goeran Maler (1989), The Acid Rain Game', in H. Folmer and E. van Ierland (eds), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Chapter 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 231-52 2. Scott Barrett (1994), Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements', Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on Environmental Economics, 46, October, 878-94 3. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment', Journal of Public Economics, 52 (3), October, 309-28 4. Michael Hoel (1992), International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions', Environmental and Resource Economics, 2 (2), March, 141-59 5. Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens (1997), The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (3), October, 379-401 PART II TECHNICAL ADVANCES 6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (2006), Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (2), May, 247-63 7. Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2006), Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited', Oxford Economic Papers, 58 (2), April, 233-63 8. Larry Karp and Leo Simon (2013), Participation Games and International Environmental Agreements: A Non-Parametric Model', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65 (2), March, 326-44 9. Carsten Helm (2001), On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a Coalitional Game with Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 30 (1), September, 141-6 PART III COMPLIANCE 10. Roegnvaldur Hannesson (1997), Fishing as a Supergame', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32 (3), March, 309-22 11. Michael Finus and Sigve Tjotta (2003), The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap Forward?' Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 2031-48 12. Henk Folmer, Pierre v. Mouche and Shannon Ragland (1993), Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems', Environmental and Resource Economics, 3 (4), August, 313-35 13. Anke Gerber and Philipp C. Wichardt (2009), Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions', Journal of Public Economics, 93 (3-4), April, 429-39 14. Todd L. Cherry and David M. McEvoy (2013), Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis', Environmental and Resource Economics, 54 (1), January, 63-77 15. David M. McEvoy and John K. Stranlund (2009), Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (4), April, 491-508 16. Nori Tarui, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky and Greg Ellis (2008), Cooperation in the Commons with Unobservable Actions', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (1), January, 37-51 17. Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner (2009) A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71 (2), August, 187-209 PART IV NEGOTIATIONS, SECOND-BEST DESIGNS AND INSTITUTIONS 18. Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen (1998), Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control', Public Choice, 96 (1-2), July, 145-86 19. Scott Barrett (2002), Consensus Treaties', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158 (4), December, 529-47 20. Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer (2012), Environmental Cooperation: Ratifying Second-Best Agreements', Public Choice, 151 (3-4), June, 565-84 21. A. Caparros, J.-C. Pereau and T. Tazdait (2004), North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information', Public Choice, 121 (3-4), December, 455-80 22. Alejandro Caparros and Jean-Christophe Pereau (2013), Forming Coalitions to Negotiate North-South Climate Agreements', Environment and Development Economics, Special Issue on Strategic Behaviour and Environmental Commons, 18 (1), February, 69-92 23. Bard Harstad (2012), Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations', Review of Economic Studies, 79 (4), October, 1527-57 24. Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori and Sonia Oreffice (2009), Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (3), March, 411-25 25. Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas Lange and Bodo Sturm (2014), Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods', Economica, 81 (322), April, 257-75 26. Scott Barrett (2006), Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies', American Economic Review, 96 (2), May, 22-5 27. Michael Hoel and Aart de Zeeuw (2010), Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?', Environmental and Resource Economics, 47 (3), November, 395-406 PART V TRANSFERS, SHARING AND FAIRNESS 28. Matthew McGinty (2007), International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Nations', Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (1), January, 45-62 29. Hans-Peter Weikard (2009), Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule', Manchester School, 77 (5), September, 575-93 30. Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements', Review of International Organizations, 1 (4), December, 379-96 31. Matthew McGinty, Garrett Milam and Alejandro Gelves (2012), Coalition Stability in Public Goods Provision: Testing an Optimal Allocation Rule', Environmental and Resource Economics, 52 (3), July, 327-45 32. Stefan Ambec and Yves Sprumont (2002), Sharing a River', Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2), December, 453-62 33. Andreas Lange and Carsten Vogt (2003), Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity', Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 2049-67 34. Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl (2009), Institution Formation in Public Goods Games', American Economic Review, 99 (4), September, 1335-55 PART VI MULTIPLE COALITIONS 35. Francesco Bosello, Barabara Buchner and Carlo Carraro (2003), Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control', Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2-3), April-May, 601-11 36. Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making', Natural Resource Modeling, 19 (3), September, 323-58 37. Geir B. Asheim, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi and Fredric C. Menz (2006), Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51 (1), January, 93-109 PART VII UNCERTAINTY, RISK AND CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 38. Seong-lin Na and Hyun Song Shin (1998), International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty', Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (2), April, 173-85 39. Michael Finus and Pedro Pintassilgo (2013), The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements', Journal of Public Economics, 103, July, 29-43 40. Alfred Endres and Cornelia Ohl (2001), International Environmental Cooperation in the One Shot Prisoners' Dilemma', Schmollers Jahrbuch, Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften/Journal of Applied Social Science Studies, 121 (1), 1-26 41. Vincent Boucher and Yann Bramoulle (2010), Providing Global Public Goods under Uncertainty', Journal of Public Economics, 94 (9-10), October, 591-603 42. Scott Barrett (2013), Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66 (2), September, 235-50 43. Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis and Andreas Loeschel (2011), Inequality, Communication, and The Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change in a Public Goods Game', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108 (29), July, 11825-9 44. Lata Gangadharan and Veronika Nemes (2009) Experimental Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty in Provisioning Private and Public Goods', Economic Inquiry 47 (1), January, 146-64 PART VIII DYNAMIC COALITION FORMATION 45. Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2007), An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54 (3), November, 296-310 46. Aart de Zeeuw (2008), Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (2), March, 163-74 47. Marc Germain, Philippe Toint, Henry Tulkens and Aart de Zeeuw (2003), Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28 (1), October, 79-99 48. Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink and Ekko van Ierland (2010), Renegotiations in the Greenhouse', Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (4), April, 573-96 49. Michele Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour (2010), A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements', Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (1), January, 25-48 Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.