Business and Government

Business and Government

Grant, Wyn; Coen, David

Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

10/2016

944

Dura

Inglês

9781783473052

15 a 20 dias

Descrição não disponível.
Contents:

Introduction
David Coen and Wyn Grant

PART I BUSINESS AND THE STATE
1. E. E. Schattschneider (1948), 'Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 259, September, 17-23

2. Theodore J. Lowi (1964), 'American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory', World Politics, 16 (4), July, 677-93, 695, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713, 715

3. George J. Stigler (1971), 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 3-21

4. Charles E. Lindblom (1977), 'The Priviledged Position of Business', in Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, Chapter 13, New York, NY, USA: Basic Books, 170-88

5. David Vogel (1978), 'Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciouness of American Corporate Executives', British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1), January, 45-78

6. Gary S. Becker (1985), 'Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs', Journal of Public Economics, 28 (3), December, 329-47

7. Robert H. Salisbury (1984), 'Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, ' American Political Science Review,78 (1), March, 64-76

8. Philippe C. Schmitter (1974), 'Still the Century of Corporatism?', Review of Politics, 36 (1), January, 85-131

9. Hugh Heclo (1978), 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in Anthony King (ed.) The New American Political System, Chapter 3, Washington, DC, USA: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 87-124

PART II ORGANISING THE FIRM FOR POLITICAL ACTION
10. Mancur Olson (1971) [1965]), 'A Taxonomy of Groups' and 'Group Size and Group Behavior', in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Chapter 1, Section F and Chapter 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,UK: Harvard University Press, 43-52, 53-65

11. Terry M. Moe (1981), 'Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups', Journal of Politics, 43 (2), May, 531-43

12. David M. Hart (2004), '"Business" Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics', Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 47-69

13. Wendy L. Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell and Jeffrey M. Drope (2004), 'Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff: Corporate Activity or Inactivity in Politics', Political Research Quarterly, 57 (3), September, 421-9

14. Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts (1994), 'The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986',
American Political Science Review, 88 (4), December, 911-26

15. Wendy L. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell (2000), 'Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics', American Political Science Review, 94 (4), December, 891-903

16. Holly Brasher and David Lowery (2006), 'The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity', Business and Politics, 8 (1), i, 1-23

PART III MANAGING GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
17. Graham K. Wilson (1990), 'Corporate Political Strategies', British Journal of Political Science, 20 (2), April, 281-8

18. David B. Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985), 'Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur', California Management Review, XXVIII (1), Fall, 124-39

19. Wyn Grant (1984), 'Large Firms and Public Policy in Britain', Journal of Public Policy, 4 (1), February, 1-17

20. Kathleen A. Getz (2001), 'Public Affairs and Political Strategy: Theoretical Foundations', Journal of Public Affairs: Special Issue Papers, 1 (4), December, 305-29 394

PART IV LOBBYING MODELS
21. David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright (1996), 'Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (2), May, 543-64

22. Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball (1998), 'Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress', American Political Science Review, 92 (4), December, 775-90

23. John M. De Figueiredo (2002), 'Lobbying and Information in Politics', Business and Politics, 4 (2), 125-29

24. Andreas Broscheid and David Coen (2003), 'Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission: An Informational Model of Forum Politics', European Union Politics, 4 (2), June, 165-89

25. Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff (2006), 'Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy', American Political Science Review, 100 (1), February, 69-84

PART V BUSINESS GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
26. Sam Peltzman (1976), 'Toward a More General Theory of Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 211-40

27. Pablo T. Spiller (1990), 'Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them be Bribed"', Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1), April, 65-101

28. Michael Moran (2000), 'The Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture: From Command State to Regulatory State?', Public Policy and Administration, 15 (4), Winter, 1-13

29. David Coen (1998), 'The European Business Interest and The Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States', Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1), January-April, 75-100

30. Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee (2006), 'A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S Bureaucracy', Journal of Politics, 68 (1), February, 128-39

PART VI COMPARATIVE BUSINESS-POLITICAL SYSTEMS
31. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich (2009), 'Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis', British Journal of Political Science, 39 (3), July, 449-82

32. Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. La Pira and Nicholas A. Semanko (2005), 'Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy', Political Research Quarterly, 58 (1), March, 19-30

33. David Coen (1997), 'The Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union', Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1), March, 91-108

34. Wyn Grant, Alberto Martinelli and William Paterson (1989), 'Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, Italy and West Germany', West European Politics, 12 (2), 72-90

35. Jean C. Oi (1992), 'Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China', World Politics, 45 (1), October, 99-126
36. Kent E. Calder (1989), 'Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex- Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government-Business Relationship', Comparative Politics, 21 (4), July, 379-403

PART VII INTERNATIONALIASTION AND TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS REGULATION
37. William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978) 'Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government: The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff', American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,
68 (2), May, 246-50

38. Helen Milner (1987), 'Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s', International Organization, 41 (4), Autumn, 639-65

39. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), 'Protection for Sale', American Economic Review, 84 (4), September, 833-50

40. A. Claire Cutler (1997), 'Artiface, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law', Review of International Political Economy, 4 (2), Summer, 261-85

41. John Gerard Ruggie (2004), 'Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues, Actors, and Practices', European Journal of International Relations, 10 (4), 499-531

42. David Vogel (2008), 'Private Global Business Regulation', Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261-82

43. Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski (2014), 'Global Private Regimes, Domestic Public Law: ISO 14001 and Pollution Reduction', Comparative Political Studies, 47 (3), 369-94

Index
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